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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MARIAN B. BOULTON, DAVID BOULTON, 
and STEVEN BOULTON, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. 
CARL H. BRONN, Alternate Trustee of 
"THE ALICE MAY HUGHES BRONN TRUST" 
and CARL H. BRONN, Individually, 
Defendants-Appellees. 
Case No. 20050391 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (j) Utah Code 
Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether a Grantor-Settlor Trust was revoked in parts as parcels of land deeded 
in trust were sold, where the trust was created in 1979 and the settlor in the grantor-type 
trust deeded 3 parcels of unimproved, unproductive acreage to the trust. The document 
did not provide that any sale thereof would result in a revocation of the trust as to the 
portions sold. Beginning in 1988, the settlor as principal trustee began selling portions of 
1 
the property in some 20 transactions over a 12 year period wherein she ordered the title 
companies to make direct deposits to existing accounts in her individual name in banks 
and investment brokers. The main issue is whether the sale of each portion revoked the 
trust as to that portion because the money was deposited into her individual accounts and 
not into the trust account, and as such is clear and convincing evidence of her intent to 
revoke. This issue was preserved in the record at R 180, 83 and TR 150, 151, 159, 166. 
Determinative Law: Internal Revenue Service Code Sections 671 through 678, and 
IRS Instructions Form 1041; Section 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii) Utah Code Annotated; 
Restatement of Law of Trusts, Second, Section 202 and 33oi; Banks v. Means, 52 P.3d 
1190 (Utah 2002); Estate of Flake. 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 2003); In the Matter of the Estate 
of West 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1997); Perronoud v. Harmon. 8 P.3d 293 (Utah App. 2000). 
Clear and convincing evidence standard: Greener v. Greener, 212 P.2d 194 (Utah 1949); 
Jardine v. Archibald. 279 P.2d 454 (Utah 1955). 
Standard of Review: In questions of contract interpretation and matters not 
requiring resort to extrinsic evidence, but based upon documentary evidence, the 
Appellate Courts accord the trial courts interpretation no presumption of correctness. 
Issues of law (conclusions of law) are reviewed for correctness. See Zions First National 
Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins.. 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), Fairbourn Commercial v. 
American Housing. 94 P.3d 292 (Utah App. 2004). 
2. Whether vested interests of remainderman beneficiaries are divested by the act 
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of the principal trustee life beneficiary's deposits of proceeds of sales or trust property 
into her individual account, and whether remainderman beneficiaries can follow the 
proceeds of sales of real property to funds received by the husband of the decedent as an 
intestate heir where the husband is also designated in the 1979 trust as an alternate trustee 
and a person entitled to one-half of the trust assets upon death of the settlor-trustee. This 
issue was preserved in the Record at R 86, and TR 160, 151, 166, 168. 
Determinative Law: Acott v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 71, 337 P.2d 720 (Utah 1959), 
2 Scott on Trust 203 (2d Ed. 1956), Bogert Trusts Section 921, p. 428, 1995 Ed. 
Standard of Review: Issue of law are reviewed for correctness. See Zions First 
National Bank v. Nat. Am. Title Ins., 749 P.2d 651 (Utah 1988), Fairbourn Commercial 
v. American Housing, 94 P.3d 292 (Utah App. 2004). 
3. Whether the trial court's findings based solely upon written materials and 
involving no assessment of witness credibility are subject to de novo determination of 
facts on appeal without deference to the trial court's findings. 
Determinative Law: In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), 
Bailev v. Call 767 P.2d 138 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
Standard of Review: Appellate Court reviews the documents de novo without 
deference to the trial court. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
a. Statute: Section 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii): 
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(3) The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust: 
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms of the 
trust; or 
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method provided 
in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by: 
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the trust or 
specifically devises property that would otherwise have passed according to 
the terms of the trust; or 
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing evidence of 
the settlor's intent. 
b. Instructions for Form 1041 pursuant to Internal Revenue Code Sections 671 
through 678 at page 4 for the year 2000: 
Special Filing Instructions for Grantor Type Trusts and Pooled Income Funds 
Grantor Type Trusts 
A trust is a grantor trust if the grantor retains certain powers or ownership 
benefits. This can also apply to only a portion of a trust. See Grantor Type Trusts 
on page 10 for details on what makes a trust a grantor trust. 
In general, a grantor trust is ignored for tax purposes and all of the income, 
deductions, etc., are treated as belonging directly to the grantor. This also applies 
to any portion of a trust that is treated as a grantor trust. 
(Addendum #3). 
Apparently Congress and the Internal Revenue Service recognized the necessity of 
a simple and convenient method for the settlor of a grantor type trust to deal with trust 
income as an individual rather than as a fiduciary who would otherwise be required to file 
Form 1041, the U. S. Income Tax Return for estates and trusts. This should not result in 
an unwary revocation and disruption of an estate plan. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
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A. Nature of the case. 
This is a civil action filed by blood relatives of a decedent who are vested 
remaindermen of a grantor-type revocable trust against the surviving husband of the 
decedent, who is also designated as Alternate Trustee of the Trust, to recover one-half of 
the proceeds received by the decedent as trustee of her revocable trust from sales of real 
property deeded to the trust. 
B. Course of proceedings and disposition in the trial court. 
Trial was held before the trial court sitting without a jury, and consisted of review 
of documentary exhibits offered and received in evidence and some limited testimony 
offered by two witnesses for the defense relative to their receipt of trust funds for 
management for the decedent. The court made findings consistent with claims of the 
plaintiffs, but rendered conclusions of law that the trust had been revoked in portions as 
the decedent trustee deposited proceeds she received as Trustee into accounts in her own 
name, and she died intestate. The trial court issued an order dismissing the complaint 
with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
Appellants begin by adopting the following summary of facts found by the trial 
court: 
On April 5, 2979, Alice May Hughes Bronn established an inter vivos trust. She 
was the settlor, the sole trustee, and the beneficiary. She reserved unto herself the right 
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to, "use, transfer, contract to sell, encumber, mortgage, convey, and in every way deal in 
and with the said real property, and any other real or personal property transferred to or 
held by the trust, without notice to or consent from any person, and to modify, amend, or 
revoke the trust, in whole or in part, in any manner, at anytime." 
The trust instrument named Plaintiffs as contingent beneficiaries for one-half of 
the corpus and Defendant, Carl H. Bronn, Alice's husband of some 60 years, for one-half, 
as of the death of the settlor, Alice May Hughes Bronn. 
The trust was funded by separate parcels of land, all located in Davis County, 
Utah, as follows: Parcel 1, 29 acres, more or less; Parcel 2, a small tract of land not 
involved in litigation; Parcel 3, subdivided into Plats A and B, entitled the Hillside 
Subdivision, containing 19 separate lots. 
Parcel 3 was sold by lot naming the grantor as Alice May Highes Bronn, trustee of 
the Alice May Hughes Bronn Trust. The conveyances occurred between September 27, 
1998 and April 17, 1992. Monies paid for each purchase were funneled through Security 
Title Company. Funds were payable to the trust, but were directed by Alice May Hughes 
Bronn, as trustee, to be deposited into her personal bank account with First Security Bank, 
located in Utah. That account was set up in her name only, without reference that the 
funds were trust assets. The total amount paid was $241,161.75. 
Parcel 1 was sold June 22, 2000. Bonneville Title Company received the purchase 
price and drew a check to Alice May Hughes Bronn, trustee, in the amount of 
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$300,349.26. The settlement statement provided that the funds were to be deposited into 
the Alice May Hughes Bronn personal account with First Security Bank. 
Part of the funds from the personal account of Alice May Hughes Bronn were 
invested by her with Merrill Lynch and part with Putnam Investment in her own name and 
not as trustee. 
Sometime during this period, Alice May Hughes Bronn and her husband, Carl 
Bronn, moved from Utah to Arlington, Virginia. While there they were importuned by a 
representative of First Union National Bank to consolidate each of their respective 
investments with the bank under an instrument entitled Trust Agreement, naming Alice 
May Bronn grantor, and First Union National Bank Private Capital Management Personal 
Trust Administration as trustee. Alice May Hughes Bronn agreed and signed the 
document on October 16, 2000. She was to receive convenient installments as she 
directed with the balance being paid to her estate at her death. 
The document was signed by Alice May Hughes Bronn at the Bronn home in 
Virginia. Three representatives of the bank witnessed her signature: James Roque; 
Glenda Briscoe; and Molly Carr. Mr. Roque and Ms. Briscoe appeared in court and 
testified that they each believed Alice May Hughes Bronn understood the nature of the 
transaction. Mr. Roque had theretofore met with the Bronns several times as the 
salesperson importuning the Bronns to accept the bank's management services. Mrs. 
Briscoe met Alice May Hughes Bronn on the date of signing for the first time and spent 
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approximately one hour with her. Each testified that the trust management document was 
reviewed with Alice May Hughes Bronn, that she appeared to understand the terms, and 
that she voluntarily signed the document. 
Thereafter, steps were taken to consolidate the investment in Alice May Hughes 
Bronn's name. That includes Merrill Lynch, Putnam, and First Security Bank in Utah. 
Carl Bronn assisted First Union Bank in that effort. 
First Union Bank was not aware of the 1979 trust concerning Parcels 1, 2, and 3 in 
Utah until sometime in March of 2001. Mr. Roque discovered the document when he 
was going through some of the Bronns' records, while he was in their home assisting with 
payment of bills, opening mail, and otherwise providing financial services. At the time, 
both Alice May Hughes Bronn and Carl Bronn were failing due to age, both being 
approximately 88 years old. At that time Alice May Hughes Bronn needed an 
independent care giver. Mr. Roque did not believe that she then was competent to 
understand financial matters, nor was she competent to either change, modify, or enter 
into other financial arrangements. Alice May Hughes Bronn died June 6, 2001. Her 
estate was probated in Virginia. The inventoary showed a value of $1,320,629. The 
Bronns had no children, nor any Wills. Accordingly, Carl Bronn inherited the whole 
estate rather than one-half of the estate as prescribed under the 1979 trust. As a 
consequence, Plaintiffs brought suit against Carl Bronn, alleging that disposition of Alice 
May Hughes Bronn's estate should be pursuant to the terms of the 1979 trust and not 
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Virginia law of intestate succession. (End of Findings of the Trial Court). 
The trial court's statement in its conclusions of law 5.C., may be considered a 
finding of fact: "One might conclude that since Alice May Hughes Bronn was considered 
incompetent by Mr. Roque to understand financial matters in March 2001,when he found 
a copy of the 1979 trust, that she must have been incompetent on October 16, 2000, when 
she signed the First Union Management document." 
Other facts contained in undisputed documents and pleadings are that Parcel 1 was 
subdivided into 20 lots and sold by deeds of conveyance between 1998 and 1992, wherein 
all deeds were signed by Alice as Principal Trustee of the Alice May Hughes Bronn 
Trust. The first four sales proceeds were deposited pursuant to Alice's direction to the 
title company into her existing account at Davis County bank, Farmington, Utah. The 
next 3 sales were similarly deposited in the same bank which became First Security Bank. 
Beginning on December 20, 1990, the next six sales were directed to be mailed to Alice's 
account with Merrill Lynch investment broker. A "pay off9 check dated September 1991 
for $21,438.63 was made payable to "Alice May Hughes Bronn, Trustee." The last 
transaction was a check to "Alice May Hughes Bronn" for $5,150.45. 
All of the foregoing sales were documented by exhibits received into evidence as 
Exhibits 7-1 through 7-17, and deeds of conveyances by Alice as Trustee, Exhibits 7B-1 
through 7B20. 
Plaintiffs'/Appellants' Exhibit 12 are documents of Bonneville Title Company, 
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Inc. relating to the sale of the 29 acre parcel, and a check of Bonneville Title dated June 
30, 2000 in the sum of $300,349.26 made payable to "Alice May Hughes Bronn, Trustee" 
and directly deposited into her First Security Bank Account in Farmington, Utah. The 
1099 Tax Reporting Form showed the Seller to be "Alice May Hughes Bronn Trust," with 
Alice's social security number 572 22 2172 which form was signed by Alice May Hughes 
bronn Trustee of the Alice May Hughes Bronn Trust. 
On October 16, 2000, Alice signed a trust management agreement with First Union 
Bank in Arlington, Virginia (P Ex 9). On December 14, 2000, pursuant to a telephone 
call from her husband Carl and a bank officer in Virginia to the Farmington bank, the sum 
of $299,758.23 was transferred from Alice's account to the trust management account of 
First Union Bank. 
The trial court's findings are consistent with the foregoing statement, however, the 
trial courts conclusions of law were that the 1979 Trust contained no specific provisions 
for the manner of amending or revoking the Trust and that Alice's intent to revoke should 
be considered under Utah Code Annotated Section 75-7-605(3)(b)(ii) which provided for 
revocation or amendment by "(n) any other method manifesting clear and convincing 
evidence of the settlor's intent." 
There was no other evidence as to Alice's intention as Grantor-Settlor to amend or 
revoke the 1979 Trust other than the deposit of the sales proceeds into her personal bank 
accounts and investment broker accounts. Alice died without a will and her estate 
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inventoried at a value of $1,320,629.00 passed to her husband, Carl, by intestate 
succession. 
Carl is now a Conservatee in California and his present estate is shown by 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 17, to approximate $3,000,000.00 which is being contested by a 
brother and nieces. Said Exhibit 17 also provides information including a letter filed in 
the California conservatorship case to William E. Brown, a brother of Carl H. Brown, 
wherein he states: 
What I don't understand is that in previous objection to the petition was the 
attorney's declaration that Carl does not need a conservator, but suddenly he 
needs one. His health is relatively good. The mentioning of taking 
prescription drugs to improve his memory, or even retain what he has, is 
more of a ploy than a solution. Carl is 92 years of age, and I have had 
Doctors tell me that they will offer to his age group or even my age group 
but doubt that any noticeable change will occur prior to our demise. Carl's 
wife took aricept before it was placed on the market; also took another 
expensive prescription. If there was any change it was imperceptible; and 
why slow down an illness when it will merely make one linger longer in an 
highly undesireable state? 
Other facts admitted by the pleadings are that Marian B. Boulton, also known as 
Marian Backman Boulton (Marian) is a resident of Bountiful, Davis County, Utah. 
Marian is the nearest surviving relative of Alice. Marian's mother, Mary Foxley 
Backman, is a half-sister of Alice. Marian was raised from infancy by the father and 
mother of Alice, David and Alice Foxley Hughes, at 413 South 200 East Farmington, 
Utah in the same household as Alice and as part of the same family, until Marian married 
at age 25. 
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Alice inherited several parcels of real property in Farmington, Utah from her 
parents. Three of such parcels were conveyed by Alice to 'The Alice May Hughes Bronn 
Trust" ( The Trust), dated April 5, 1979, at Bountiful, Utah. The Trust was recorded in 
the office of the Davis County Recorder, Farmington, Utah, on the 5th day of April 1979, 
in Book 767, Page 643. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The 1979 Trust anticipated the sale of the real property in furtherance of trust 
purposes and did not constitute a revocation or modification of the trust. This case differs 
from the appellate decisions which held that a sale of the real property revoked the trust 
as to the portion sold because in those other cases it was emphasized that there were 
specific provisions in the trust instruments which stated that the sale or other disposition 
would constitute, as to such whole or part, a revocation of the trust. 
Alice May Hughes Bronn (Alice) sold each portion of the real property as Trustee 
of the trust, made conveyances as Trustee, and received payments through title companies 
as Trustee directing the title companies to make direct deposits to her existing bank 
accounts or investment broker accounts. 
As the life beneficiary of a Grantor Type Trust, the trust for income tax purposes is 
ignored and all income and deductions are treated as belonging to the grantor who is not 
required to file a fiduciary return or to obtain an Employer Identification Number (EIN) 
nor to issue a K-l for beneficiary's share of income. Accordingly, the deposits to her 
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individual accounts were a convenience and no indication of intent to modify or revoke 
the trust. 
The Plaintiffs as remaindermen beneficiaries had vested interests which were 
never divested. 
There was no clear and convincing evidence manifesting an intent by Alice to 
revoke or amend the trust. The terms of the trust do not provide a method of revocation 
or amendment and the statute and rules of law require clear and convincing evidence of 
the settlor's intent to revoke or modify the trust. 
The clear and convincing evidence was that Alice May Hughes Bronn intended 
that during her lifetime she alone would control the real property and the proceeds from 
the sales of the real property. There was no evidence that she intended to modify or 
revoke the 1979 Trust by continuing to control the proceeds from the sales of the real 
property. 
Alice May's failure to deposit proceeds from sales of the real property into 
accounts in the name of the Trust was a non-act, not an intentional act to modify or 
revoke the Trust. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE 1979 TRUST ANTICIPATED THE SALE OF TRUST REAL 
PROPERTY IN FURTHERANCE OF TRUST PURPOSES AND DID NOT 
CONSTITUTE REVOCATION OR MODIFICATION OF THE TRUST. 
The Alice May Hughes Bronn Trust of 1979 is much different from the trust in 
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Matter of Estate of West 948 P.2d 351 (Utah 1977). The Bronn Trust did not specify that 
the sale of the real property would constitute a revocation as was the basis in the West 
case. 
Alice May was the sole beneficiary of the Trust during her lifetime, and her 
correspondence contained in Plaintiffs' Exhibit #6 clearly showed that the sales were to 
provide for her lifetime support. 
The real property of the Trust is situated east of the Farmington City Cemetery and 
as real property produced no income other than by development and/or sale. There was 
no benefit to any beneficiary to hold the real estate, pay taxes, and receive no income. 
Also, paragraph 4 of the Trust for the benefit of the contingent beneficiaries would 
require sale of the real property in order for Carl Bronn "to have distributed to him one-
half of the trust estate for his exclusive use, ownership and benefit." It would be unlikely 
for him to receive his share without a partition by sale, otherwise his "exclusive use" 
would be useless without benefit. 
The said paragraph 4 also provides, "The remaining one-half shall be held in trust 
to pay or distribute annually the income from said one-half to Marian B. Boulton for life 
with the remainder to her sons, David and Steven, equally...." Again, the only practical 
method of such division and use would be the sale of the real property to provide the 
source of income. Alice May certainly did not intend that her income and that of the 
contingent beneficiaries would come from rentals or other use of that mountain-side 
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property. 
The significant and controlling provisions in the West case were emphasized by 
italics in the decision: 
[3] Paragraph 5 of the trust document provides: 
We reserve unto ourselves the power and right at any time during our 
lifetime to amend or revoke in whole or in part the trust hereby created 
without the necessity of obtaining the consent of any beneficiary and 
without giving notice to any beneficiary. The sale or other disposition by 
us of the whole or any part of the property held hereunder shall constitute 
as to such whole or part a revocation of this trust. 
West, 948 P.2d at 354. The Court concluded: "Because his conveyance of the property 
out of the trust as the sole trustee worked a termination of the trust (paragraph 5), no trust, 
existed at his death, and the children's contingent interest in the terminated trust avails 
them nothing." Id. at 356. 
Many, if not most Settlors create trusts to avoid probate. They don't usually 
anticipate the thwarting of that purpose by successors who divert the assets to probate 
proceedings. Alice's husband received the trust assets through probate as an intestate 
estate. Transformed trust assets follow the trust as held in Acott v. Tomlinson, 9 Utah 2d 
71, 76; 337 P.2d 720 (Utah 1959): "A trustee is chargeable with responsibility for the res 
of the trust and any increase therein, as well as for any property or proceeds into which it 
is transformed and which supplant it." (The opinion footnotes 2 Scott on Trusts 203 (2d 
Ed. 1956). Also to this effect is Bogert Section 921, page 428, 1995 Ed.). 
Also, Townsend v. Raniew Nat. Bank, 751 P.2d 1214 (Wash.App. 1988) at page 
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1216 states: "Of course trust property does not lose its character by conversion into funds, 
other property or investments." (Citing other authorities including Bogert). 
The Defendants cited to the trial court the West case that a sale would revoke the 
trust and in addition, cited the Utah Court of Appeals case of Perrenoud v. Harman. 8 
P.3d 293 (Utah App. 2000). However, the defendants failed to state what the court stated 
in paragraph 9 of the opinion on page 295 that, "Paragraph 3 of the Thurber Trust is 
identical to paragraph 5 of the trust in West and states: . . . . 'The sale or other disposition 
by us of the whole or any part of the property held hereunder shall constitute as to such 
whole or part a revocation of this trust"' No such provision was contained in the 1979 
Bronn Trust. 
In the Perrenoud case, it was the sale which revoked the trust to the house because 
the trust so provided. The surviving widow who sold the house under a note for 
installment payments, made a will giving the note to her own children to the exclusion of 
the children of the deceased husband who would have benefitted from the trust if not 
revoked. Thus, in absence of a trust provision that sale of the property would revoke the 
trust, a sale by the widow would not have revoked the trust as to the children of the 
deceased husband because they would have shared in the installment note which became 
substituted for the house. It was the emphasized provision of the trust which revoked the 
trust by sale of the house. In absence of that provision there would be no revocation, and 
the sale by the widow and her bequeath of the proceeds to her own children would not 
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have prevailed. The widow sold the property and retained the note in August 1992, and 
she presumably kept all the installment payments until her death in 1996. The Perrenoud 
opinion quoted from the West case that while "it is not clear that the surviving settlor may 
revoke the trust, the surviving trustee clearly may work a revocation by selling or 
disposing of the property.'5 Perrenoud, 8 P.3d at 295 (second column). 
The Court in West further explained the statement that though it was not "clear" 
that the surviving settlor may revoke the trust, it was clear that the surviving trustee may 
work a revocation by sale stating: "The sale or disposition of the trust property can be 
accomplished only by the trustee(s) in whom the legal title resides. Any power granted to 
Herschel and Hazel as trustees could be exercised by him unilaterally after the death of 
Hazel." West. 948 P.2d at 354, comment [4]. 
Therefore the disposition of the house by Herschel to his second wife was 
accomplished by Herschel as trustee, not as settlor. 
Similarly, in the Bronn case, the property was sold by Alice as trustee, not as 
settlor. The Utah Uniform Trust Code Section 75-7-605 (3) and (4) states: 
(3) The settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust: 
(a) by substantially complying with a method provided in the terms 
of the trust; or 
(b) if the terms of the trust do not provide a method or the method 
provided in the terms is not expressly made exclusive, by: 
(i) executing a later will or codicil that expressly refers to the 
trust or specifically devises property that would otherwise have 
passed according to the terms of the trust; or 
(ii) any other method manifesting clear and convincing 
evidence of the settlor's intent. 
17 
(4) Upon revocation of a revocable trust, the trustee shall deliver the trust 
property as the settlor directs. 
Alice clearly could sell the tracts and receive the money as trustee. There is no 
evidence that Alice was acting as settlor in any subsequent dealing with the proceeds, and 
certainly no clear and convincing evidence that the deposits of proceeds into accounts 
held in her individual name were acts done by Alice as settlor manifesting an intent to 
revoke or amend the trust. 
The retention of sale proceeds by Alice in her own name was consistent with her 
being the "sole acting trustee and beneficiary," which is better than if instead of 
depositing the proceeds into bank or bond accounts and investment broker accounts, she 
had placed the money in her home safe or shoe box. Alice died intestate and as such did 
not bequeath the proceeds in contradiction or violation of the Trust and continued to hold 
the money as Trustee. 
Intent 
Analysis of the intention of Alice with respect to disposition of her estate should 
begin with review of the provisions of the 1979 Trust. In 1979, the objects of her bounty 
were clearly her husband, Carl, for one-half and the remaining one-half for her nearest 
blood relatives, the Plaintiffs. There was no evidence that the relationship of Alice to her 
relatives changed during her lifetime. There was no evidence that she desired Carl to 
inherit her entire estate, and the reasonable presumption is that she knew he had assets in 
his own name equal to hers (his estate was stated in the conservatorship to be 
IS 
$3,000,000.00) and Carl's heirs would be his brother and nieces. There was no evidence 
that Alice ever considered her husband's brother and nieces objects of her bounty to 
induce her to revoke the 1979 Trust. 
Other reasonable presumptions as to Alice's intent in preserving the 1979 Trust are 
that an important purpose of such a trust is to avoid probate similarly as the Court stated 
in West that it appeared "that the purpose of this form-book trust document may have 
been simply to avoid probate." West, 948 P.2d at 354. The 1979 Trust was not the 
typical form-book trust and as such was more specifically designed to avoid probate and 
to facilitate a definite plan for liquidation of real property in a manner to provide first for 
the needs and uses of Alice and then to distribute through the Trust the remainder to the 
objects of her bounty over a course of years. 
Alice's intent in retaining proceeds sales in investments in her own name are 
consistent with the provisions of the Trust that she "shall be the Principal Trustee and as 
such shall be the sold acting trustee and beneficiary of this trust with the power and right 
to use, transfer, contract to sell, encumber, mortgage, convey and in every was deal in and 
with the said real property and any other real or personal property transferred to or held 
by the Alice May Hughes Bronn trust (The Trust). . . ." None of the listed powers and 
rights were violated by her re-investment of proceeds of sales of real property of the trust 
and were not indicated to constitute a revocation of the Trust either as to herself or the 
vested remaindermen. If she had intended revocation she could well have specifically 
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stated so in advance of each or any of some 20 transactions. 
The last transaction, the sale of the 29 acre tract, closed through Bonneville Title 
Company, is evidenced by Plaintiffs' Exhibit 12. Page 1 of Exhibit 12 is the check from 
Bonneville dated 6-30-00 in the sum of $300,349.26, payable to the order of "Alice May 
Hughes Bronn, Trustee." Plage 2 is the commitment for title insurance which recites that 
title to the land in fee simple is vested in "Alice May Hughes Bronn as Principal Trustee, 
and unto Carl H. Bronn as Alternate Trustee; and unto Marian B. Boulton and George K. 
Fadel as Successor Trustees." Page 4 is a letter from Bonneville's escrow officer 
addressed to Alice May Hughes Bronn dated May 15, 2000, enclosing a Settlement, 
Warranty Deed, Escrow Instructions and a 1099 S Tax Reporting Form to be completed 
by Alice and returned "along with a Copy of The Alice May Hughes Bronn Trust (this is 
very important for us to verify proper transfer of title....)." Pages 8 and 9 are Escrow 
Instructions dated 5-1-00 signed by "Alice May Hughes Bronn, As Principal Trustee of 
The Alice May Hughes Bronn Trust." Page 10 shows a receipt issued by First Security, 
Layton Hills Branch dated 7-05-2000 showing a deposit of $300,349.26 to account 
#1271006510. 
Page 11 is a letter from Armstrong Law Offices, Brent R. Armstrong dated May 
12, 2000, addressed to Bonneville Title Company re "Sale by Alice May Hughes Bronn 
Trust to U. S. D. S. Investment Group. L. C. wherein Mr. Armstrong listed 7 comments of 
which comments 5(c) and 7 are especially relevant and important. Comment 5 (c) states: 
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"The 'signature block' for the Seller should be added on page 6 to clearly evidence that 
Seller is to be signing in the capacity of Trustee of the Bronn Trust. This should be 
similar to the 'signature block' you proposed on the Warranty Deed." Comment 7 states: 
"We have marked up the 1099S Tax Reporting Form to reflect that the Seller is a trust, 
that there in only one seller (no 'additional' seller) and that Carl H. Bronn is not a 
signatory to the transaction. 
Copies of the noted amendments to the 1099S Tax Reporting form are at pages 14 
and 15, wherein the corrected Form 1099S is signed by "Alice May Hughes Bronn As 
Principal Trustee of The Alice May Hughes Bronn Trust." 
The correspondence and directions of Attorney Brent R. Armstrong are especially 
significant in demonstrating that he as attorney for Alice May Hughes Bronn Trustee was 
emphasizing that the transaction be solely reflected as a Trust transaction. Also, had 
Alice May intended to modify or revoke the Trust, she had ample opportunity to request 
Mr. Armstrong's assistance or advice on such matter. Instead, Alice May received the 
proceeds as Trustee and ultimately deposited the same with First Union Bank as a trustee 
under a management trust for Alice May Bronn, Exhibit 9, dated October 16, 2000. 
The 1979 Trust was not revoked by said sales. Alice died intestate. In both West 
and Perrenoud, the surviving settlor-trustee disposed of the property by wills which 
constitute evidence of intent to revoke the trusts. There were no such documents showing 
an intent to modify the interests of the remaindermen beneficiaries in the Bronn Case, nor 
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any other clear and convincing evidence that Alice intended to revoke the 1979 Trust. 
Clear and Convincing Evidence 
In the case of Jardine v. Archibald, 3 Utah 2d 88, 94, 279 P.2d 454 (Utah 1955) 
this Court quoted from its previous opinion in Greener v. Greener. 
[7] In Greener v. Greener, 166 Utah 571, 202 P.2d 194 on pages 204-205, 
this court speaking through Mr. Justice Wolfe in defining what quantum of proof 
is needed to be clear and convincing said: 
" * * * That proof is convincing which carries with it, not only the power to 
persuade the mind as to the probable truth or correctness of the fact it 
purports to prove, but has the element of clinching such truth or correctness. 
Clear and convincing proof clinches what might be otherwise only probable 
to the mind. * * * 
"But for a matter to be clear and convincing to a particular mind it 
must at least have reached the point where there remains no serious or 
substantial doubt as to the correctness of the conclusion. * * *" 
The undisputed facts supported by documentary evidence reviewed herein are clear 
and convincing that the retention by Alice of trust funds in her own name during her 
lifetime were evidence that she dealt with sale of the property and retention of the funds 
in manners pursuant to, and consistent with the terms of the Trust, and there was no 
evidence of an intent to revoke the Trust. 
POINT II: THE CONTINGENT BENEFICIARIES HAD VESTED INTERESTS 
WHICH WERE NEVER DIVESTED 
In the Estate of West 948 P.2d 35 L relied upon by the defendants, the Trust 
provided that the settlors declared they held said real property therein on the death of the 
survivor for use and benefit of three named children. The Supreme Courts opinion added, 
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"The children's vested rights are subject to divestiture and will not ripen until the death of 
the surviving settlor." Id at 356. The significance of this latter quotation is that the 
interests of the children were vested, and were it not for the emphasized provision, that 
sale would constitute a revocation, the interest would not have been divested. 
A subsequent case decided by the Supreme Court, Banks v. Means, 52 P.3d 1190 
(Utah 2002), affirmed the children's entitlement to their vested interests as against an aunt 
who claimed under an amendment, which the Court held did not constitute a revocation 
of the original trust and that a complete revocation was required to divest the 
beneficiaries of their vested interests. Id. at 1193. The Court footnoted a quotation from 
Blacks Law Dictionary 1557 (7th ed. 1999) as follows: 
A "vested" interest is something that had become a completed, 
consummated right for present of future enjoyment; not contingent; 
unconditional; absolute.. . . An interest may be vested, even where it does 
not carry a right to immediate possession, if it does confer a fixed right of 
taking possession in the future. 
The Bronn 1979 Trust was more than a mere acknowledgment of a trust by a 
settlor. It was a conveyance, stating Alice May, Grantor, "do [es] hereby bargain, sell, 
convey, warrant and transfer the tracts of land . . . . unto [her]self, Alice May Hughes 
Bronn as Principal Trustee; and unto Carl H. Bronn as Alternate Trustee; and unto Marian 
B. Boulton and George K. Fadel as Successor Trustees; and unto Zions First 
National Bank Trust Department as substitute to either Successor Trustee for the uses and 
purposes herein set forth." 
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Title thus became vested in all of the above-named, subject to Alice May being the 
Principal Trustee and sole acting trustee and beneficiary for life. She, at no time, 
modified, amended or revoked the conveyance to herself and other alternate or successor 
trustees. Nothing she did in selling real property or depositing proceeds were inconsistent 
with her lifetime entitlement and the entitlement of the surviving beneficiaries. 
In another later Supreme Court decision, In Re Estate of Flake, 71 P.3d 589 (Utah 
2003), the Court stated that a trustee has exclusive control of the trust property, subject 
only to the limitation imposed by law or the trust instrument. Once the settlor has created 
the trust, he is no longer the owner of the trust property and has only the ability to deal 
with it as is expressly reserved to him in the trust instrument. The court added: 
However, as is the case with the 1987 Trust Agreement, if the Settlor does not 
specify the method of modification, then "The power may be exercised by any 
method which sufficiently manifests his intention to modify the trust".... In 
interpreting the terms of a trust, the proper focus of inquiry is the settlor's intent. 
Id. at 594 (citations omitted). The Court also stated: "We held in Banks that revocation 
was required when terminating a vested interest." Id. at 595. 
When Alice May Hughes Bronn died, the proceeds in the 1979 Trust immediately 
became the property of the remaindermen beneficiaries to be administered by a qualified 
subsequent trusteee. The proceeds passed through the Trust and were not subject to 
probate. The defendants having received the proceeds without right through probate 
should be required to account to the subsequent qualified Trustee for administration 
pursuant to terms of the Trust. 
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POINT III: ALICE MAY HUGHES BRONN DID NOT CHANGE HER STATUS 
FROM THAT OF A TRUSTEE BY DEPOSITING PROCEEDS FROM SALE 
OF TRUST PROPERTY INTO HER INDIVIDUAL BANK ACCOUNTS AND 
INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS. 
When Alice May Hughes Bronn sold the parcels of real property, she did so as 
Trustee of the 1979 Trust. Her direction to have proceeds deposited in an account in her 
name without designating that she was receiving the deposit as Trustee and not as a 
individual does not change the fact that she was dealing with trust funds and was 
continuing to hold the funds as Trustee. 
This analysis is supported by the converse of the holding of this Court in the case 
ofTWR Inc. v.Michel 66 P.3d 1031 (Utah App. 2003). In TWN. Inc.. one Christenson 
received a tax deed in his name as grantee "Richard Christenson" and later conveyed the 
tract as grantor identified in the deed as "Richard A. Christenson, Trustee." TWN, Inc., 
the plaintiff, contended that the grantee of the deed received nothing because Christenson 
was not in fact a trustee. This Court, reversed summary judgment which was granted 
plaintiff by the trial court, holding that the word "Trustee" was nevertheless just 
describing the individual, Richard Christenson; and not restricting his capacity to that of a 
trustee apart from being an individual. This Court held: 
[2] para 8 Although Defendants argue in general terms that the unexplained 
appearance of the word "trustee" creates ambiguity on the face of the deed from 
Mr. Christenson to Zions Bank, the thrust of their argument brings them within the 
doctrine known as "descriptio personae." This term is defined as "the use of a 
word or phrase merely to identify or point out the person intended and not as an 
intimation that the language in connection with which it occurs is to apply to him 
only in the technical character which might appear to be indicated by the word." 
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Id. at 1033. 
Several other Utah appellate decisions were cited in support of the "descriptio 
personae" doctrine. 
There was no evidence that Alice May Hughes Bronn changed her status from that 
of a Trustee to that of an individual disregarding the trust merely by subsequent deposits 
and investments which did not continue her name as Trustee. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of the trial court should be reversed, and the cause remanded to the trial 
court to grant judgment to the plaintiffs for amounts due under the 1979 Trust, as 
determined by an accounting. 
Dated this /p day of July, 2005. 
Respectfully submitted, 
rge K. Fadel 
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants 
Certificate of Mailing 
I certify I mailed two copies of the foregoing to Mr. Bart J. Johnsen, Attorney for 
the Appellees, on this day of July, 2005, addressed to 50 South Main Street, Suite 
#1600, S. L. C , Utah, 84145-0340. 
*-/?/# 
George K. Fadel 
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APPELLANTS' ADDENDUM 
TRIAL COURT ORDER 
1979 TRUST DOCUMENT 
EXCERPT FROM INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE INSTRUCTIONS, FORM 1040 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MARIAN B. BOULTON, DAVID BOULTON, 
and STEVEN BOULTON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CARL H. BRONN, Alternate Trustee of "THE 
ALICE MAY HUGHES BRONN TRUST" and 
CARL H. BRONN, Individually, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND ORDER 
Case No. 030700067 
Judae Darwin C. Hansen 
VD18411342 
030700067 BRONN.CARL H 
Plaintiffs' Complaint came for trial before the Honorable Judge Darwin C. Hansen in 
his courtroom on March 22 and 23,2005. Based upon the testimony of the witnesses, the 
evidence presented, and good cause appearing therefor, the Court now makes and enters 
its, 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
i. On April 5,1979, Alice May Hughes Bronn established an inter vivos 
revocable tmst She was the settlor, the sole trustee, and the beneficiary. She 
reserved unto herself the right to, "use, transfer, contract to sell, encumber, mortgage, 
convey, and in every way deal in and with the said real property, and any other real or 
personal property transferred to or held by the trust, without notice to or consent from 
any person, and to modify, amend, or revoke the trust, in whole or in part, in any 
manner, at anytime." 
2. The trust instrument named Plaintiffs as contingent beneficiaries for one-
half of the corpus and Defendant, Cart H. Bronn, Alice's husband of some 60 years, for 
one-half, as of the death of the settlor, Alice May Hughes Bronn. 
3. The trust was funded by separate parcels of land, all located in Davis 
County, Utah, as follows: Parcel 1,29 acres, more or less; Parcel 2, a small tract of 
land not involved in this litigation; Parcel 3, subdivided into Plats A and B, entitled the 
Hillside Subdivision, containing 19 separate lots. 
4. Parcel 3 was sold by lot naming the grantor as Alice May Hughes Bronn, 
trustee of the Alice May Hughes Bronn Trust. The conveyances occurred between 
September 27,1988, and April 17,1992. Monies paid for each purchase were 
tunneled through Security Title Company. Funds were payable to the trust, but were 
directed by Alice May Hughes Bronn, as trustee, to be deposited into her personal bank 
account with First Security Bank, located in Utah. That account was set up in her name 
only, without reference that the funds were trust assets. The total amount paid was 
$241,161.75. 
5. Parcel 1 was sold June 22, 2000. Bonneville Title Company received the 
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I purchase price and drew a check to Alice May Hughes Bronn, trustee, in the amount of 
I 5300,349.26. The settlement statement provided that the funds were to be deposited 
S into the Alice May Hughes Bronn personal account with First Security Bank. 
t 
6. Part of the funds from the personal account of Alice May Hughes Bronn 
were invested by her with Merrill Lynch and part with Putnam Investment in her own 
name and not as trustee. 
7. Sometime during this period, Alice May Hughes Bronn and her husband, 
Carl Bronn, moved from Utah to Arlington, Virginia. While there they were importuned 
by a representative of First Union National Bank to consolidate each of their respective 
investments with the bank under an instrument entitled Trust Agreement, naming Alice 
May Bronn grantor, and First Union National Bank Private Capital Management 
Personal Trust Administration as trustee. Alice May Hughes Bronn agreed and signed 
the document on October 16, 2000. She was to receive convenient installments as she 
directed with the balance being paid to her estate at her death. 
8. The document was signed by Alice May Hughes Bronn at the Bronn 
home in Virginia. Three representatives of the bank witnessed her signature: James 
Roque; Glenda Briscoe; and Molly Carr. Mr. Roque and Ms. Briscoe appeared in court 
and testified that they each believed Alice May Hughes Bronn understood the nature of 
the transaction. Mr. Roque had theretofore met with the Bronns several times as the 
salesperson importuning the Bronns to accept the bank's management services. Mrs. 
Briscoe met Alice May Hughes Bronn on the date of signing for the first time and spent 
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approximately one hour with her. Each testified that the trust management document 
was reviewed with Alice May Hughes Bronn, that she appeared to understand its terms, 
and that she voluntarily signed the document. 
9. Thereafter, steps were taken to consolidate the investment in Alice May 
Hughes Bronn's name. That includes Merrill Lynch, Putnam, and First Security Bank in 
Utah. Carl Bronn assisted First Union Bank in that effort. 
10. First Union Bank was not aware of the 1979 trust concerning Parcels 1.2, 
and 3 in Utah until sometime in March of 2001. Mr. Roque discovered the document 
when he was going through some of the Bronns' records, while he was in their home 
assisting with payment of bills, opening mail, and otherwise providing financial services. 
At the time, both Alice May Hughes Bronn and Carl Bronn were failing due to age, both 
being approximately 88 years old. At that time Alice May Hughes Bronn needed an 
independent caregiver. Mr. Roque did not believe that she then was competent to 
understand financial matters, nor was she competent to either change, modify, or enter 
into other financial arrangements. 
11. Alice May Hughes Bronn died June 6, 2001. Her estate was probated in 
Virginia. The inventory showed a value of $1,320,629. The Bronns had no children, 
nor any Wills. Accordingly, Carl Bronn inherited the whole estate rather than one-half 
of the estate as prescribed under the 1979 trust. As a consequence, Plaintiffs brought 
suit against Carl Bronn, alleging that disposition of Alice May Hughes Bronn's estate 
should be pursuant to the terms of the 1979 trust and not Virginia law of intestate 
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t succession. 
$ The Court, having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact, and with good 
% 
!J cause therefor, now makes its, 
r 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The 1979 trust was revocable by Alice May Hughes Bronn and was 
subject to being amended or modified. The trust contained no specific provision for 
such action by her as trustor. Therefore, the Court must consider her intent to revoke, 
amend, or modify based upon her conduct. Utah Code §75-7-605(3)(b)(ii). 
2. Each time Afice May Hughes Bronn, as trustee, sold a tract of land from 
the trust and deposited the funds into her personal account, she revoked that portion of 
the trust. As trustee, she, in effect, paid herself as beneficiary of the trust and 
thereafter could use and transfer those funds as she chose independent of the trust 
provisions. 
3. The fact that Alice May Hughes Bronn treated every sale of land from the 
trust the same way, that is, depositing the funds from each sale into her personal 
account and thereafter investing a portion of those funds in Merrill Lynch and Putnam, 
also in her name, confirms her intent to revoke those funds from the provisions of the 
1979'trust. 
4. The First Union Bank trust created October 16, 2000 does not fit the 
typical definition of a trust under Virginia law because the contingent beneficiary is Alice 
May Hughes Bronn's estate, which is not a legal entity. Arnold, v. Gooobey, 77 S.E.2d 
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382, 386 (Va. 1953). Therefore, when Alice May Hughes Bronn moved her personal 
First Security Bank account in Utah to First Union Bank in Virginia, she was merely 
moving her personal account from one bank to another. The move didn't revoke the 
1979 trust, because that trust had already been revoked as to funds derived by Alice 
May Hughes Bronn from the sale of land when those monies were deposited into her 
personal account with First Security Bank. First Union Bank acted only as a manager 
of Alice May Hughes Bronn's assets deposited with that bank. 
5, Whether Alice May Hughes Bronn was or was not competent to 
understand the terms of the First Union Management trust executed October 16, 2000 
and the legal consequences must be determined as follows: 
A. Whether Alice May Hughes Bronn signed the document. It is clear that 
she signed the First Union document. Three witnesses confirmed that 
fact. Whether she understood the legal implication must be determined 
by her past conduct as compared to the fiscal arrangements with First 
Union Bank. 
B. What were the First Union financial arrangements. First Union was not a 
typical trust. It was a financial manager only regarding funds transferred 
from Alice May Hughes Bronn's personal account and other personal 
investments to the bank for management purposes. The Court concludes 
that she did understand the transaction because the funds transferred 
remained in her own name as a personal investment outside the terms of 
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 * the 1979 trust. 
| C. What were the legal implications. One might conclude that since Alice 
\ 
!; May Hughes Bronn was considered incompetent by Mr. Roque to 
understand financial matters in March 2001, when he found a copy of the 
1979 trust, that she must have been incompetent on October 16,2000, 
when she signed the First Union Management document. Even if that 
were true, it is of no legal consequence because Carl Bronn would have 
inherited Alice May Hughes Bronn's estate in full, whether the estate 
monies were still invested as existed prior to October 16, 2000, or after 
they were deposited with First Union. Thus, the legal consequences 
would have been the same because those funds were not subject to the 
1979 trust when they were deposited in the First Security Bank in Alice 
May Hughes Bronn's name personally and not as trustee of the Alice May 
Hughes Bronn trust. 
6. The Court does not conclude that the 1979 trust was revoked in total. It 
may be that Parcel 2 remains in the trust corpus and thus would be still subject to the 
terms and conditions of the trust. No evidence was presented on this point. 
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BASED UPON the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
It is hereby, ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
1. Defendant is awarded Judgment against Plaintiff for no cause of action. 
2. Defendant is awarded costs. 
DATED this / ^ _ day o f < < ^ k ^ O < 2005 
APPROVED AS TO FORM 
/ 
.FADEL 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
TWIN C. HANSEN 
)istrict Court Judge 
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£ correct copy of the foregoing to be served via U.S. Mail, first class postage prepaid, 
upon the following 
George K Fadel 
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111K ALICE MAY HUGHES BRONN TRUST 
5 3 0 9 5 0
 D E E D 0 F CONVEYANCE & DECLARATION /Sf^'JO iW /( 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: 
That 1, ALICE MAY HUGHES BRONN, a resident of* Davis 
County, State of utah, now .sojourning temporarily In Virginia, 
Grantor, and herein sometimes cabled Settlor, do hereby bargain, 
sell, convey, warrant and transfer the tracts of land in Davis 
County, Utah, described on the attached sheet which bears the 
signature of the Grantor of even date with this document and which 
sheet is incorporated herein and made a part hereof as though fully 
set forth herein, unto myself, ALICE MAY HUGHES BRONN. as Principal 
Trustee; and unto CARL H. BRONN as Alternate Trustee; and unto 
MARIAN B. BOULTON and GEORGE K. FADEL of Bountiful, Utah, as 
Successor Trustees; and unto ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK TRUST 
DEPARTMENT as substitute to either Successor Trustee, for the uses 
and purposes herein set forth. 
1. During the lifetime of* the Settlor, the said Settlor, 
/ Alice May Hughes Bronn, shall he I he Principal Trustee and as such 
| ii .shall be the sole acting trustee and beneficiary of this trust with 
the power and right to use, transfer, contract to sell, encumber, 
mortgage, convey and in every way deal in and with the said real 
property and any other real or personal property transferred to or 
held by the Alice May Hugheb Bronn Trust (The Trust ) without notice 
to or consent from any person, and to modify, amend, or revoke 
the trust in whole or in part in any manner at any time, 
2. Upon the death or adjudicated incompetent y of Sett lor 
the order of succession as acting trustee shall be: 
O $ (a) Carl H. Bronn, Alternate Trustee; 
(b) Marian B. Boulton and George K. Kadel, acting 
jointly as Successor Trustees. 
(c) Zions First National Bank Trust Department as 
substitute to either or both successor trustees in the event 
either or both are not qualified to act or contine to act. 
3- During her lifetime, the Settlor shall he the sole 
beneficiary of the trust. 
h Upon the death of Settlor, Carl H. Bronn, il he 
survives Settlor, shall be entitled to have distributed to him 
one-half of the trust estate for his exclusive use, ownership and 
benefit. The remaining one-half shall be held in I rust to pay or 
distribute annually the income from said one-half and one-twentieth 
of the principal annually of said one-half to Marian B. Boulton for 
life with the remainder to her sons David and Steven, equally and 
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in lull upon the death of Marian B. Boulton. 'Jhe portion to which 
Marian, David and Steven Boulton shall become entitled may not be 
disposed of by assignment or order, voluntary or involuntary, nor 
shall said interest be subject to any process of attachment, 
garnishment, execution or claim of any creditor whatsoever during 
the lifetime of Marian B. Boulton. 
5* Any acting trustee may qualify upon the death of 
Settlor by filing in the office of the Davis County Recorder, 
Farmington, Utah, a brief statement about as follows: 
"I, ___
 t agree to act as trustee 
according to the provisions of THE ALICE MAI HUGHES BRONN 
TRUST dated April 5, 1979, on file in the office of 
the Davis County Recorder, .Farmington, Utah. 
Dated »" 
3/ , 
6. From time to time, I, the Settlor, may add real and 
personal property to this trust by conveyance or transfer to the 
trust by name or other reference and such additional property 
shall then be subject to and administered in accordance with this 
trust. 
DATED this fifth day of April, 1979-
Alice May Hughe s^feronn/ Settlor 
STATE OF UTAH)
 } 
: s s 
COUNTY OF DAVIS) 
On t h i s <3 day of A p r i l , 1979, p e r s o n a l l y appeared 
b e f o r e me, A l i c e May Hughes Bronn, t h e s i g n e r of t he w i t h i n 
i n s t r u m e n t who d u l y acknowledged t o me t h a t she executed t h e same. 
TTo^EaryTrublic ' ~ 
^.„ Res id ing a t B o u n t i f u l , Utah 
-- My^Gkmmiss^ion emp i r e s : 
™&WY' fro 
645 
'DESCRIPTION OF REAL PROPERTY ATTACHED '10 THE 
ALICE MAY HUGHES BRONN TRUST OF APRIL 5, 1979 
The following described tracts in Davis County, State 
of Utah are conveyed to the AT ICE MAY HUGHES BRONN TRUST, to 
which this document is attached 
Parcel 1. All of the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast 
Quarter of Section 30, Township 3 North, Range 1 East, 
Salt Lake Base & Meridian, less that portion thereof 
heretofore conveyed to the Farmington Area Pressurized 
Irrigation District, described as: 
( Beginning at the East Quarter Corner of Section it), 
Township 3 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base <fe 
J Meridian, thence running N 0°41!00!l W along the 
'* section line 714-53 feet; thence S 6*9° 19*00" W 
3& feet to the brow of the hill; thence N 50°54'42" 
"V W 130.37 feet; thence N 6°27,40lr W 117-19 feet: 
thence S 89° 19f00" W 314-42 feet; thence S 9°4of 
^ W 595 feet parallel with the aqueduct; thence S 
^ 1055!11" E 324-84 feet; thence N 6*9° 47! 10" E 
565.35 feet to the point of beginning. Containing 
10.68 acres. 
Parcel 2. Beginning on an old ience lute marking the nortfi 
side of Section 30, Township 3 North, Range 1 East, Salt 
Lake Meridian, at a point 374-22 feet West from the 
*? Northeast corner of the west half of the Northeast 
^ Quarter of Section 30 (Said £ "£ corner being about 13 
*V A feet west of the old fence line earlier marking the 
^ .said i i corner line); thence South 151.1*4 feet; thence 
/^"j> West 75 feet; thence North 151 feet t*o said section line; 
{rt^vV'ji "thence East 7^ feet to point of beginning. 
v
 J- Parcel 3- Beginning at the Northeast corner of the West 
half of the Northeast Quarter of Section 30, Township 
3 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running 
thence West 5.67 chains; thence South 2.29 chains; thence 
\)West 2-45 chains, more or less, to the boundary estab-
**lished with Farmington City by deed dated February 4, 
* 1976; thence South 0° 29' West 647.44 feet, more'or less, 
^ along said established line to the North line of a sub-
division; thence East along the North line of said 
subdivision to a point due South of beginning; thence 
North 12.72 chains to beginning, less that portion here-
tofore conveyed to others described as: 
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of the West half 
of the Northeast Quarter of Section 30, Township 3 
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian; and 
running thence West 374-22 feet along the Section 
line; thence South 151.14 feet; thence West 237-29 
feet to the old fence line; thence South 0°29f West 
175-0 feet along the old fence line and deed line; 
thence East 626.0 feet, more or less, to the old 
fence line; thence North 326.14 feet along the old 
fence line; thence West 13.0 feet; more or less, to 
the point of beginning. Containing 3-85 acres. 
DATED this fifth day of April, 1979-
Alice May Hughes Brgjm 
(&*,• )n^- f-U^/^'y^^ 
• Was in existence on August 20, 1996, 
• Was treated as a domestic trust on 
August 19, 1996, and 
• Elected to continue to be treated as a 
domestic trust. 
See T.D. 8813, I.R.B. 1999-9, 34 
(1999-1 C.B. 631) for more information 
on the court and control tests See also 
Notice 96-65, 1996-2 C.B\ 232, under 
which a trust (including a wholly-owned 
grantor trust) may amend the provisions 
of the trust in order to meet the new 
statutory requirements. 
A tltist that is not a domestic trust is 
treated as a foreign trust. If ycu are the 
trustee of a foreign trust, file Form 
1040NR instead of Form 1041. Also, a 
foreign trust with a U.S. owner generally 
must file Form 3520-A, Annual 
Information Return of Foreign Trust With 
a U.S. Owner. 
If a domestic trust becomes a foreign 
trust, it is treated under section 684 as 
having transferred all of its assets to a 
foreign trust, except to the extent a 
grantor or another person is treated as the 
Dwner of the trust when the trust becomes 
a foreign trust. 
Special Rule for Certain Revocable 
Trusts 
Section 645 provides that the executor of 
m estate and the trustee of a qualified 
evocable trust can elect to treat the trust 
s part of the estate instead of filing a 
eparate Form 1041 for the trust. The 
lection applies to all tax years of the 
state ending after the date of the 
ecedent's death and before the 
pplicable date, as defined below. Once 
lade, the election is irrevocable. 
ualified revocable trusts. A qualified 
jvocable trust for this purpose is any 
jst or portion of a trust that is treated 
iders section 676 as having been owned 
r the decedent whose estate is making 
e election, because of a power in the 
antor of the trust to revoke the trust. For 
is purpose, a power does not include 
ly power in the grantor that is treated 
held by the grantor because ii is held 
his or her spouse. 
>plicable date. The applicable date is 
her: 
If the estate is required to file a Federal 
tate tax return, the date that is 6 months 
er the date of the final determination of 
> Federal estate ta* liability or 
f the estate is not required to file a 
deral estate tax return, the date that is 
ears after the date of the decedent's 
ath. 
king the election. You make the 
ction by attaching a statement to Form 
H. The original statement must be 
iched to Form 1041 filed by the due 
e (including extensions) for the estate 
its first tax year. If the original return 
j filed on time, you may make the 
?tion on an amended return filed no 
r than 6 months after the due date of 
return (excluding extensions). Write 
*d pursuant to section 301.9100-2" at 
the top of the amended return, and file it 
at the same address you used for the 
original return. 
If the revocable trust must file a Form 
1041 for the tax year ending after the date 
of the decedent's death, you must attach 
a copy of the statement to that return. 
See Rev. Proc. 98-13, I.R.B. 1998-4, 
21 (1998-1 C.B. 37p) for details of what 
you must include in the statement and for 
additional information on the election. 
Bankruptcy Estate 
The bankruptcy trustee or debtor-in-
possession must file Form 1041 for the 
estate of an individual involved in 
bankruptcy proceedings under chapter 7 
or 11 of title 11 of the United States Code 
if the estate has gross income for the tax 
year of $6,475 or more. See Of Special 
Interest To Bankruptcy Trustees and 
Debtors-in-Possession on page 8 for 
details. 
Common Trust Funds 
Do not file Form 1041 for a common trust 
fund maintained by a bank. Instead, the 
fund may use Form 1065, U.S. Return of 
Partnership Income, for its return. For 
more details, see section 584 and 
Regulations section 1.6032-1. 
Qualified Settlement Funds 
The trustee of a designated or qualified 
settlement fund must file Form 1120-SF, 
U.S. Income Tax Return for Settlement 
Funds, rather than Form 1041. 
Special Filing Instructions 
for Grantor Type Trusts and 
Pooled Income Funds 
Grantor Type Trusts 
A trust is a grantor tr jst if the grantor 
retains certain powers or ownership 
benefits. This can also apply to only a 
portion of a trust. See Grantor Type 
Trusts on page 10 for details on what 
makes a trust a grantor trust. 
In general, a grantor trust is ignored for 
tax purposes and all of the income, 
deductions, etc., are treated as belonging 
directly to the grantor This also applies 
to any portion of a trust that is treated as 
a grantor trust. ^ 
Wjym The following instructions apply 
y 1 ^ only to grantor type trusts that are 
Ri'HHE not using an optional filing method. 
File Form 1041 for a grantor trust 
unless you use an optional filing method. 
If the entire trust is a grantor trust, fill in 
only the entity portion of Form 1041. Do 
not show any dollar amounts on the form, 
itself; show dollar amounts only on an 
attachment to the form. Do not use 
Schedule K-1 (Form 1041) as the 
attachment. 
If only part of the trust is treated as a 
grantor trust, report on Form 1041 only 
the part of the income, deductions, etc., 
that is taxable to the trust. The amounts 
that are taxable directly to the grantor are 
shown only on an attachment to the form. 
Do not use Schedule K-1 (Form 1041) 
as the attachment. 
On the attachment, report: 
• The name, identifying number, and 
address of the person(s) to whom the 
income is taxable; 
• The income of the trust that is taxable 
to the grantor or another person under 
sections 671 through 678. Report the 
income in the same detail as it would be 
reported on the grantor's return had it 
been received directly by the grantor; and 
• Any deductions or credits that apply to 
this income. Report these deductions and 
credits in the same detail as they would 
be reported on the grantor's return had 
they been received directly by the grantor. 
The income taxable to the grantor or 
another person under sections 671 
through 678 and the deductions and 
credits that apply to that income must be 
reported by that person on their own 
income tax return. 
Example. The John Doe Trust is a 
grantor type trust. During the year, the 
trust sold 100 shares of ABC stock for 
$1,010 in which it had a basis of $10 and 
200 shares of XYZ stock for $10 in which 
it had a $1,020 basis. 
The trust does not report these 
transactions on Form 1041. Instead, a 
schedule is attached to the Form 1041 
showing each stock transaction 
separately and in the same detail as John 
Doe (grantor and owner) will need to 
report these transactions on his Schedule 
D (Form 1040). The trust may not net the 
capital gains and losses, nor may it issue 
John Doe a-Schedule K-1 (Form 1041) 
showing a $10 long-term capital loss. 
Optional Filing Methods for Certain 
Grantor Type Trusts 
Generally, if a trust is treated as owned 
by one grantor or other person, the 
trustee may choose Optional Method 1 
or Optional Method 2 as th6 trust's 
method of reporting instead of filing Form 
1041. 
Generally, if a trust is treated as owned 
by two or more grantors or other 
persons, the trustee may choose 
Optional Method 3 as the trust's method 
of reporting instead of filing Form 1041. 
Once you choose the trust's filing 
method, you must follow the rules under 
Changing filing methods if you want to 
change to another method. 
Exceptions. The following trusts cannot 
report using the optional filing methods: 
1. A common trust fund (as defined in 
section 584(a)). 
2. A foreign trust or a trust that has 
any of its assets located outside the 
United States. 
3. A qualified subchapter S trust (as 
defined in section 1361(d)(3)). 
4. A trust all of which is treated as 
owned by one grantor or one other person 
whose tax year is other than a calendar 
year. 
